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BREAKING THE CEMENT: VENEZUELA’S MOVE TO NATIONALIZE CEMEX LEADS TO 






In the recent years, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez announced his 
plans to nationalize foreign-owned cement companies.  The cement companies of 
CEMEX Caracas Investments B.V. and CEMEX Caracas II Investments B.V. 
(CEMEX) initiated this arbitration proceeding against the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela (Venezuela) at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID).1 CEMEX is the largest supplier of cement in Venezuela.2 The 
dispute arose out of President Chavez’s seizure of Cemex Venezuela (CemVen) 
carried out by three decrees and by occupation of CEMEX plants by Venezuelan 
armed forces at the same time.3  This proceeding focuses on whether ICSID has 
jurisdiction over this dispute under the Venezuela-Netherlands Bilateral 
Investment Treaty (BIT) and/or Article 22 of Venezuela’s Investment Law (Article 
22).  
                                                 
* Shari Manasseh is a 2012 Juris Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University 
Dickinson School of Law. 
1 CEMEX Caracas Investments B.V. and CEMEX Caracas II Investments B.V. v. 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No: ARB/08/15, Date of Decision on 
Jurisdiction of 30 December 2010 (Gilbert Guillaume, Georges Abi-Saab and Robert B. 
von Mehren) [hereinafter Jurisdiction]. 
2 CEMEX Caracas Investments B.V. and CEMEX Caracas II Investments B.V. v. 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No: ARB/08/15, Date of Decision on the 
Claimant’s Request for Provisional Measures of 3 March 2010 at 3 (Gilbert Guillaume, 
Georges Abi-Saab, and Robert B. von Mehren) [hereinafter Provisional Measures]. 
3 Id. at 9. 




II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY 
 
CEMEX initiated the Request for Arbitration to complain about the 
nationalization of Venezuelan company, CemVen, in which they held an indirect 
ownership interest.4 Venezuela submitted information regarding the structure of 
the companies involved in the case to which a few of their arguments are 
dependent upon. Venezuela submitted that a Mexican company, Cemex, S.A.B. de 
C.V. owns 100% of Cemex España S.A., which owns 100% of one of the 
Claimants, a Dutch company called Cemex Caracas.5 Cemex Caracas then owns 
100% of the other Claimant, another Dutch company called Cemex Caracas II.6 
Cemex Caracas II owns 100% of Vencement Investments (Vencement).7 
Vencement is a company incorporated in the Cayman Islands.8 As of 2002, 
Vencement owns 75.7% of CemVen, the cement company that operated in 
Venezuela.9  
 CEMEX contended they were deprived of their rights of ownership over 
CemVen.10 CEMEX submitted their claims arose out of Venezuela’s seizure of 
CemVen, which was carried out by decrees of May 27, 2008, August 15, 2008, and 
August 19, 2008 and by the occupation of CEMEX plants by Venezuelan armed 
forces at the same time.11 In their Request for Arbitration, CEMEX asked for a 
declaration noting the aforementioned breaches and an order that “[Venezuela] 
restore to [CEMEX] their shares in, and complete and exclusive control of, 
[CemVen].”12 Thus, CEMEX submitted the Tribunal has jurisdiction because of 
                                                 
4 Id. at 6. 
5 Id.  
6 Id. 
7 Provisional Measures at 6.  
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 3.  
11 Jurisdiction at 9. 
12 Provisional Measures at 3.  




Article 22 and from the BIT.13 Venezuela, however, objected to both of CEMEX’s 
alleged bases of ICSID jurisdiction.14 
 
III. CEMEX’S ARGUMENTS FOR JURISDICTION  
 
A. Jurisdiction under the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT 
 
CEMEX argued, “the sole question facing the Tribunal under the… BIT is 
whether Claimants’ indirect equity stake in [CemVen] S.A.C.A is an ‘investment’ 
for purposes of Article 1(a).”15 To which, Claimants answered a “resounding 
‘yes’.”16 CEMEX defined “investment” in Article 1(a) of the BIT as non-
exhaustive and extending to indirect investments.17 CEMEX relied on prior arbitral 
decisions to support their broad interpretation of “investment.”18 CEMEX also 
submitted Venezuela could not “overcome decades of unanimous case law” and 
that once jurisdiction is established under the BIT, then the Tribunal may hear all 
claims from the Request for Arbitration.19 Moreover, CEMEX argued other 
provisions of the BIT also reinforce their conclusion that the BIT covers indirect 
investments.20  
 
B. Jurisdiction Under Article 22 of the Investment Law 
 
Translated into English, Article 22 could read as: 
 
                                                 
13 Jurisdiction at 16. 
14 Id. at 17. 
15 Id. at 13. 
16 Id.  
17 Id. at 9.  
18 Jurisdiction at 9. 
19 Id. at 13. 
20 Id. at 9. 
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Disputes arising between an international investor whose 
country of origin has in effect with Venezuela a treaty or 
agreement on the promotion and protection of investments, 
or disputes to which the provisions of the Convention 
establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(OMGI-MIGA) or the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and nationals of other 
States (ICSID) are applicable, shall be submitted to 
international arbitration according to the terms of the 
respective treaty or agreement, if it so provides, without 
prejudice to the possibility of making use, when appropriate, 
of the dispute resolution means provided for under the 
Venezuelan legislation in effect.21 
 
CEMEX argued Article 22 “separately and independently from the BIT” conferred 
jurisdiction on ICSID.22 CEMEX considered Venezuela’s narrow interpretation of 
ownership or control not well founded.23 Furthermore, CEMEX considered their 
investment as an “international investment” and that they were “international 
investors” for purposes of the Investment Law.24 Overall, CEMEX referred to the 
intention of the drafters of Article 22 and stressed consent to arbitration in Article 
22 did not conflict with Venezuelan Law.25 
                                                 
21 Id. at 18. 
22 Id. at 10. 
23 Jurisdiction at 10. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 10. 





IV. VENEZUELA’S ARGUMENTS AGAINST ICSID JURISDICTION 
 
A. Jurisdiction Under the BIT 
 
Venezuela claimed CEMEX’s indirect ownership of the CemVen 
precluded them for coverage under the BIT.26 Particularly, Venezuela argued 
Article 1(a) of the BIT defined “investments” to include “every kind of asset” but 
that it did not refer to the subject of direct or indirect ownership or control.27 
Venezuela, thus, contended the absence of the referral to direct or indirect 
ownership or control from the definition of investment in comparison to other 
BITs showed that the BIT did not cover indirect investors.28  
 Furthermore, Venezuela argued the BIT’s broad definition of “national” 
reinforced their interpretation of the BIT and that it only concerned investments 
located in the territory of the Contracting Parties.29 Venezuela argued CEMEX 
qualified as Dutch Nationals under the BIT because of their incorporation in the 
Netherlands.30 Venezuela, however, noted that CEMEX do not themselves have 
investments in Venezuela.31 Venezuela claimed CEMEX’s indirect investments did 
not entitle them to assert claims for alleged violation of the BIT.32 Venezuela 
further argued CEMEX failed to explain the absence of Vencement as a party to 
this proceeding.33 Overall, Venezuela argued CEMEX are not the “proper parties 
to this proceeding.”34 
 
                                                 
26 Id. at 7.  
27 Id. 
28 Jurisdiction at 7.   
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id.  
32 Id.  
33 Jurisdiction at 11. 
34 Id. at 7. 
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B. Jurisdiction under Article 22 of Venezuela’s Investment Law 
 
Venezuela argued Article 22 of the Investment Law did not provide the 
“requisite express and unequivocal consent to ICSID arbitration” required by 
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention.35 Venezuela contended the Investment Law 
must be interpreted in the light of Venezuelan legal principles and though while it 
may not be definitive, it played an important role in the Article 22 analysis.36 
Venezuela added under their law, consent to arbitration must be clear, express and 
unequivocal.37 Venezuela referred to publications and commentaries on the 
Investment Law, Venezuelan legal principles and to a Venezuelan Supreme Court 
decision.38 Ultimately, Venezuela concluded that a comparison of Article 22 with 
other national investment laws and ICSID case law supported their claim.39 
Furthermore, Venezuela submitted neither CEMEX nor themselves 
consented to ICSID jurisdiction as required by Article 25.40 Article 25(1) indicated, 
“the jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out 
of an investment…which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to 
the Centre.41 Venezuela claimed the writing requirement in Article 25 should be 
satisfied through a contract or in a document accepting an offer previously made.42 
Venezuela argued neither CEMEX’s letter “accepting the Republic’s offer of 
consent to ICSID arbitration contained in Article 9(1) of the Dutch Treaty” nor the 
Request for Arbitration “made any reference to, or purported to accept, any 
consent of the Republic for ICSID arbitration supposedly contained in Article 22 
of the Investment Law.”43 According to Venezuela, CEMEX reserved their right in 
                                                 
35 Id. at 8. 
36 Id. at 18. 
37 Id. at 19. 
38 Jurisdiction at 8. 
39 Id. at 8. 
40 Id. at 7. 
41 Id. at 16. 
42 Id. at 7. 
43 Jurisdiction at 8. 




a footnote in the request for provisional measures and that it did so after having 
initiated the arbitration without invoking expressly the Investment Law.44 
Venezuela ultimately argued the footnote could not be considered as a written 
consent given in due time and as such CEMEX did not satisfy the writing 
requirement of Article 25.45 
Alternatively, Venezuela submitted that “[CEMEX] was [not] the “owner” of 
CemVen, which is the alleged “investment” in this case.”46 According to 
Venezuela, CEMEX did not directly control CemVen and as such, they did not 
qualify as “international investors” under the Investment Law.47  
 
 
V. DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL  
 
 CEMEX submitted that the tribunal could reach a conclusion on the BIT 
without analyzing Article 22 since Article 9 of the BIT embodied consent even if 
under Article 22 jurisdiction lacked.48 Venezuela contended that both issues be 
addressed by the Tribunal.49 The Tribunal agreed with Venezuela and addressed 
both issues.50 
                                                 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id.  
47 Id. 
48 Jurisdiction at 17. 
49 Id.  
50 Id.  




A. Tribunal’s Decision Regarding Article 22 of the Investment Law 
 
 1. Standard of Interpretation 
 
 The parties disagreed on the interpretation of Article 22 – CEMEX 
submitted Venezuela consented to ICSID jurisdiction while Venezuela contended 
the text did not provide such consent.51 Thus, in order to clarify the meaning of 
Article 22, the Tribunal began by determining the standard of interpretation to be 
used.52 The Tribunal noted that under Article 41(1) of the ICSID Convention, they 
were the “judge of its own competence.”53 As such, the Tribunal found the 
interpretation given to Article 22 by Venezuelan authorities or by Venezuelan 
courts could not control the Tribunal’s decision on its own competence.54 Instead, 
the Tribunal found the interpretation must be interpreted according to the ICSID 
Convention and to the principles of international law governing unilateral 
declarations of States.55 
  
 
 2. Content of the Standard 
 
The Tribunal then discussed the writing requirement for consent pursuant 
to Article 25 of the ICSID Convention.56 The Tribunal noted that while Article 25 
detailed consent in writing as necessary, the text did not give any further indication 
about either the manner or timing of such consent or the way in which it must be 
                                                 
51 Id. at 18. 
52 Id.  
53 Jurisdiction at 19. 
54 Id.  
55 Id. at 22. 
56 Id.  




interpreted.57 The Tribunal found persuasive a distinction recognized by the 
International Law Commission of the United Nations between rules governing 
States’ unilateral declarations in international law: (a) declarations formulated in 
the framework and on the basis of a treaty, and (b) other declarations made by 
States in the exercise of their freedom to act on the international plane.58 While 
both declarations may have the effect of creating international obligations, the 
Tribunal found when considering declarations not made within the framework and 
on the basis of a treaty, the utmost caution is required when deciding whether or 
not those declarations create such obligations.59 The Tribunal found, nonetheless, 
the rules of interpretation are different when unilateral declarations are formulated 
in the framework of a treaty and on the basis of such a treaty.60 
  Accordingly, the Tribunal found persuasive the method by which the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) interpreted unilateral declarations of 
compulsory jurisdiction.61 The ICJ stressed that every declaration “must be 
interpreted as it stands, having regard to the words actually used.”62 When 
interpreting, the ICJ begins with the text and if the text is ambiguous, by giving 
due consideration to the context and examining the evidence regarding the 
circumstances of its preparation and the purposes intended to be served.63 It is 
based on these rules of international law, the Tribunal used to interpret Article 
22.64 The Tribunal also found relevant but not determinative domestic law and 
international law of treaties.65 
                                                 
57 Id.  
58 Jurisdiction at 23. 
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
61 Id.  
62 Id. at 24. 
63 Jurisdiction at 24. 
64 Id.  
65 Id. 




 3. Interpretation of Article 22 
 
Following the ICJ approach, the Tribunal began their interpretative 
analysis with the text of Article 22.66 According to Article 22, disputes arising 
under the BIT or to which the ICSID Convention is applicable “shall be submitted 
to international arbitration according to the terms of the respective treaty or 
agreement, if it so provides.”67 The Tribunal explained the parties agreed that the 
provision created an obligation to go to arbitration subject to certain conditions but 
that they disagreed on the interpretation to be given to the words “if it so 
provides.”68 For CEMEX, the Tribunal noted, “it” referred to the ICSID 
Convention and that Article 22 should be considered a “binding direction that the 
State must submit to international arbitration all controversies to which the ICSID 
Convention applie[d]”.69  
On the other hand, the Tribunal described that Venezuela contended that 
Article 22 did not itself constitute a general consent to ICSID arbitration.70 The 
Tribunal further explained Venezuela argued that Article 22 required such disputes 
be submitted to arbitration according to the terms of the ICSID Convention.71 
Particularly, “if it so provides” meant “that consent to ICSID arbitration of a 
particular dispute or class of disputes has been given in writing both by the 
Republic and the investor.”72 Thus, as the Tribunal expressed, Venezuela argued in 
the absence of such written consent, ICSID did not have jurisdiction in the present 
case.73 
                                                 
66 Id. at 25. 
67 Id. 
68 Jurisdiction at 25. 
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 26. 
71 Id. at 26. 
72 Id.  
73 Jurisdiction at 26.  




The Tribunal explained grammatically the “it” that is in dispute between 
CEMEX and Venezuela referred to the preceding words “treaty or agreement”, 
which would include the ICSID Convention.74 The Tribunal observed the term 
“treaty” as comprehensive and normally included “conventions.”75 The Tribunal, 
however, explained the word “so” could be interpreted in two ways: (a) if the 
treaty, agreement or convention provided for international arbitration; or (b) if the 
treaty, agreement or convention created an obligation for the State to submit 
disputes to international arbitration.76 In the first case, the word “so” referred to 
international arbitration whereas in the second case it referred to the obligation to 
submit disputes to international arbitration.77 
In numerous cases concerning unilateral declaration, the ICJ decided it 
“could not base itself on a purely grammatical interpretation of the text.”78 Facing 
a similar situation, the Tribunal decided it needed to look further to interpret 
Article 22.79  
 
4.      The Principle of Effet Utile80 
 
CEMEX invoked the principle of effet utile (ut res magis valeat quam 
pereat) as they submitted, “under the doctrine of l’effet utile, Article 22 should 
…be interpreted as Venezuela’s binding consent to ICSID arbitration.”81 
                                                 
74 Id. at 27. 
75 Id. 
76 Id.  
77 Id.  
78 Jurisdiction at 28. 
79 Id. 
80 The principle of effet utile indicates that a treaty instrument must be interpreted in the 
manner most favorable to the fulfillment of the purposes of the organization concerned. 
INTERNATIONAL DECISION: Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a 
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights. Advisory Opinion. 
<http://www.icj-cij.org>. International Court of Justice, April 29, 1999, 93 Am. J. Int'l L. 
913 (1999). 
81 Jurisdiction at 28.  
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Venezuela, on the other hand, contended that the function of Article 22 was to 
acknowledge and confirm the commitments of Venezuela to submit disputes to 
international arbitration in accordance with its treaty obligations and that such 
acknowledgment and confirmation has an effet utile.82  
  In analyzing this dispute, the Tribunal found persuasive ICJ case law.83 
In one case, the ICJ recognized the principle of effet utile should be generally 
applied when interpreting the text of the treaty.84 In another case, the ICJ found 
effet utile should be interpreted in a manner compatible with the effect sought by 
the reserving State.85 
  The Tribunal agreed with both rulings of the ICJ.86 The Tribunal also 
explained the principle of effet utile would be unhelpful in Article 22 
interpretation.87 The Tribunal, thus, noted in order to interpret Article 22; they 
would consider its context, purpose, and the circumstances of its preparation in 
order to determine Venezuela’s intention when adopting Article 22.88 
 
5. Context and Purpose 
 
The Tribunal began their analysis of the context and purpose of Article 22 
with an analysis of Article 1 of the Investment Law.89 The Tribunal explained that 
according to Article 1, the aims of the Investment Law were in general terms 
comparable to those of treaties on promotion and reciprocal protection of 
investments.90 The Tribunal expressed, however, the rights accorded to 
international investors are often qualified in order not to affect the application of 
                                                 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 30. 
84 Id. at 29. 
85 Id. at 30. 
86 Jurisdiction at 30. 
87 Id.  
88 Id.  
89 Id. at 32. 
90 Id. at 33. 




Venezuelan Law or the rights of Venezuelan investors.91 Thus, the Tribunal further 
explained, the Investment Law differed in some respects from BITs.92 Specifically, 
the Tribunal conceded that Venezuela incorporated a mandatory arbitration clause 
in the seventeen BITs concluded before 1999.93 The Tribunal, however, noted that 
those previous clauses did not imply that Venezuela would be ready to accept such 
an obligation with which it did not have a BIT.94 Thus, the Tribunal described one 
could not draw from Article 1 that Article 22 must be interpreted as having 
established consent by Venezuela to submit to arbitration all potential disputes 
falling within the protection of the ICSID Convention.95 As a result, the Tribunal 
concluded when Venezuela adopted Article 22, they did not intend to give in 
advance a general consent to ICSID arbitration in the absence of any Treaty.96 
 
6. Legislative History 
 
The Tribunal, then, began to analyze the legislative history of Article 22 
with the hopes that it would provide more useful information about the intention of 
the drafters of the Investment Law.97 The Investment Law, however, was a decree-
law and thus, not discussed in Parliament.98 The Tribunal admitted, therefore, they 
have no “direct information about its preparation.”99 According to the Tribunal, 
CEMEX submitted the drafters of Article 22 intended it to be a binding offer of 
ICSID Arbitration.100   
 
                                                 
91 Jurisdiction at 33.  
92 Id.  
93 Id.  
94 Id. 
95 Id.  
96 Jurisdiction at 35. 
97 Id. 
98 Id.  
99 Id.  
100 Id.  





   
Ultimately, the Tribunal concluded, if Venezuela intended to give its 
advance consent to ICSID arbitration in general then it would have been easy for 
the drafters of Article 22 to express that intention clearly by using any of the other 
clauses.101 Therefore, the Tribunal formulated that Venezuela did not establish 
their intention and, as a result, Article 22 did not provide a basis for jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal in the present case.102 
 
B. Tribunal’s Decision On The BIT 
 
Article 9(1) of the BIT provided that: 
 
[D]isputes between one Contracting Party and a national of 
the other Contracting party concerning an obligation of the 
former under this agreement in relation to an investment of 
the later, shall at the request of the national concerned be 
submitted to the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes for settlement by arbitration or 
conciliation under [the ICSID Convention.]103  
 
Article 9 added that “each contracting Party hereby gives its unconditional consent 
to the submission of disputes as referred to in paragraph 1 of this article to 
international arbitration in accordance with the provisions of this Article.”104 
                                                 
101 Jurisdiction at 35. 
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 39. 
104 Id. 




CEMEX contended that the Tribunal had jurisdiction under the BIT, while 
Venezuela denied such claim.105 Venezuela referred to the claims made by 
CEMEX that arose from their nationalization of CemVen.106 Venezuela alleged 
that based on the complex structure of the corporations involved in this proceeding 
that CEMEX, as indirect investors, did not have an investment in Venezuela’s 
territory.107 
The Tribunal observed that numerous ICSID decisions and awards 
considered “indirect investments.”108 The Tribunal noted the BIT contained no 
explicit reference to indirect investments but nevertheless described the definition 
of investment as very broad.109 The Tribunal found relevant prior arbitral case law 
to which investments were defined as broad and non-exhaustive.110 Thus, the 
Tribunal concluded that investments as defined in Article 1 of the BIT could be 
indirect.111  
The Tribunal further explained by definition an indirect investment could 
be considered as an investment made by an indirect investor.112 As the BIT 
covered indirect investments, the Tribunal found it entitled indirect investors to 
assert claims for alleged violations of the Treaty convening the investments that 
they indirectly owned.113 Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that when the BIT 
mentioned investments “of” nationals of the other Contracting Party, it meant that 
those investments must belong to such nationals in order to be covered by the 
Treaty.114 The Tribunal, explained, however, that such description did not imply 
                                                 
105 Id. 
106 Jurisdiction at 39. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 41. 
109 Id. at 42. 
110 Id.  
111 Jurisdiction at 43. 
112 Id.  
113 Id.  
114 Id. 
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that they must be “directly” owned by those nationals.115 Additionally, the 
Tribunal, expressed when the BIT mentioned investments made “in” the territory 
of a Contracting party, the BIT required that the investment itself be situated in 
that territory.116  
The Tribunal, thus, concluded the CEMEX had jus standi in the case and 
Venezuela’s objection to the ICSID jurisdiction could not be upheld.117 Ultimately, 
the Tribunal concluded they did not have jurisdiction over the claims under Article 




This arbitration proceeding is significant because it focuses on a relatively 
recent legislation of Venezuela that has caused much spark and controversy. 
Particularly, what remains to be seen is to what extent the nationalization policies 
have frightened foreign investment and whether Venezuela will ever be able to 
attract foreign investors once again. Although, if Chavez should have to pay 
CEMEX, foreign investment into Venezuela may continue as it may indicate to 
many foreign-owned companies justice granted.  
Additionally, the Tribunal’s proclamation that domestic laws are relevant 
but still not determinative in whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction highlights the 
Tribunal’s right to competence-competence. The Tribunal’s refusal to find 
Venezuelan authority precedent illustrates the Tribunal’s desire to remain as an 
autonomous and neutral entity, an essential factor for international arbitration. 
                                                 
115 Id.  
116 Jurisdiction at 44. 
117 Id. 
